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Essentialism is an ontological belief that there exists an underlying essence
to a category. This article advances and tests in three studies the hypothesis
that communication about a social category, and expected or actual mutual validation, promotes essentialism about a social category. In Study 1,
people who wrote communications about a social category to their ingroup
audiences essentialized it more strongly than those who simply memorized
about it. In Study 2, communicators whose messages about a novel social
category were more elaborately discussed with a confederate showed a
stronger tendency to essentialize it. In Study 3, communicators who elaborately talked about a social category with a naive conversant also essentialized the social category. A meta-analysis of the results supported the hypothesis that communication promotes essentialism. Although essentialism
has been discussed primarily in perceptual and cognitive domains, the role
of social processes as its antecedent deserves greater attention.
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Social scientists have taken for granted the observation that humans construct
social reality through symbolically mediated social interaction. Large scale social
institutions such as nation states, financial systems, and even universities are undoubtedly human constructions that define social realities, which in turn shape
human social action (e.g., Durkheim, 1982; Giddens, 1993). Social interactions in
small groups, too, generate social reality that is largely emergent in the particular
situation (e.g., Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1950; Sherif, 1936). However, until a recent
return of interest in the social basis of cognition, this critical observation had lain
dormant in the background of social psychological theorizing, despite some notable exceptions (e.g., Moscovici, 1976; Rommetveit, 1974). While philosophers (e.g.,
Searle, 1995) are debating the ontological structure of social reality, there is a critical question of how we come to have a psychological sense of social reality, which
Higgins and his colleagues called shared reality (e.g., Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992), and what may be its social psychological consequences.
All the more significant for social psychology is the shared reality of a social
category, or a large aggregate of individuals such as gender-, ethnicity-, and nationality-based groups. A social category is a distinct type of social group (Lickel
et al., 2000); however, not all social categories are equally psychologically real. As
Allport (1954) noted, some social categories have “primary potency” and “act like
shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations that we might otherwise
perceive” (p. 179). These are psychologically real social categories. With Rothbart
and Taylor (1992), we suggest that psychologically real social categories may be
essentialized, that is, seen to possess an immutable underlying essence. In this article,
we consider interpersonal communication as a source of the psychological sense
of social reality. As Hardin and Higgins (1996) put it,
in the absence of social verification, experience is transitory, random, and ephemeral . . . But once recognized by others and shared in an on-going, dynamic process
of social verification . . . experience is no longer subjective; instead, it achieves the
phenomenological status of objective reality. That is, experience is established as
valid and reliable to the extent that it is shared with others” (p. 28).

In particular, as Kashima (2004) suggested, under some circumstances, a communicator’s act of speaking about a social category and establishing a mutual understanding about it with an audience--the process that Clark (1996; see Kashima,
Klein, & Clark, 2007) called grounding--may be sufficient for the communicator to
establish what Higgins and his colleagues called a shared reality, and to essentialize the social category. We explicate this hypothesis below, and three studies are
reported in its support.

Communication and Essentialism
What would happen when people learn about a novel social category? One of
the consequences, largely neglected in social psychology, is for them to talk about
it. Let us call the person who has the information about the category, sender, and
the other who is ignorant of it and receives the sender’s communication, receiver.
Under this circumstance, how would their conversation proceed? Clark’s (1996)
grounding model gives a clear guidance. The sender begins a phase of communi-
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cation by presenting an utterance that contains some propositional representations
about the social category: Group X is like P, where P stands for some properties
of the group. In order to complete the communication, the receiver is obliged to
indicate his or her understanding of the utterance (i.e., acceptance) by providing
the sender with verbal or nonverbal evidence that he or she has understood it appropriately. Evidence could take various forms (e.g., Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson,
2000; Clark, 1996), from a simple acknowledgment such as “OK” or “Oh, yeah,” to
a more elaborate paraphrasing or probing questions, such as “So, group X is like
P, and they do things like p1, p2, and p3, huh?” When the sender gains sufficient
confidence that the receiver has understood his or her impression about the social
category, or the group impression is grounded between the communicators well
enough, this phase of the communication ends.
The grounding of the sender’s impression by the receiver may establish shared
reality in the sense Hardin and Higgins (1996) described it. Because the sender
is the only person who has the information, the receiver is unlikely or unable to
disagree with the sender’s impression. In the absence of a disagreement, the receiver’s understanding of the sender’s impression may be seen by the sender as
evidence that the receiver has also agreed with the sender’s impression. Note that
Echterhoff, Higgins, and Groll’s (2005) findings imply that people infer from a
successful referential communication the agreement about the impression unless
there is evidence to suggest otherwise (we will return to this point later). Underlying this process is the sender’s epistemic motivation to verify his or her knowledge
intersubjectively by establishing shared reality (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, &
Groll, 2008). If the receiver’s acceptance of the sender’s presentation is elaborate,
its effect on the sender is likely to be greater than when the receiver accepts it with
a minimal acknowledgment. This is because more elaborate grounding would give
stronger evidence of intersubjective verification, and help the sender gain greater
confidence in the establishment of a shared reality with the receiver.
We contend that when the sender’s impressions about a social category are more
extensively grounded and intersubjectively validated, the more essentialized the
sender’s perceptions of the social category may become. Essentialism is a naive
ontological belief that there exists an underlying hidden reality, or an immutable
essence, beneath the surface appearance of category exemplars (e.g., Gelman, 2004;
Medin & Ortony, 1989). In line with Medin and Ortony’s thinking, we suggest
that people have a cognitive schema about a category, which we call the essenceappearance schema. In this schema, appearances are observable characteristics
of the exemplars of a category; an essence is that which causes, generates, and
gives rise to the appearances. When this schema is used to understand a category,
the category is essentialized. An essence is usually unobservable, and therefore
people often do not know what it is. It is best regarded as a “placeholder” (Medin
& Ortony, 1989). People only have to assume that there exists something which
causes the appearances. Critically, the essence must be immutable. If a category
can be changed by human activities, it is an artifact, and it does not have a reality
independent of human action. Once a category is essentialized, and its essence is
regarded as unchangeable, human efforts cannot do anything about it, and it lies
in the realm that cannot be touched by human intervention.
The present hypothesis--communication promotes essentialism--has important
boundary conditions. First of all, the sender should have some ambiguous information about a social category, but the receiver should have no information about
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the social category. Second, the sender should attribute sufficient epistemic credibility to the receiver in order for the latter to be treated as a partner for intersubjective verification. When the sender has an epistemic authority about ambiguous information and the receiver is sufficiently credible, the sender would feel an
epistemic need to verify his or her impression intersubjectively, assume that the
receiver’s understanding implies his or her endorsement and verification, and
trust the receiver’s endorsement as sufficient evidence for the veridicality of the
grounded information. Thus, excluded from the scope of the present hypothesis
are the conditions in which (1) the sender’s information is unambiguous, or (2)
both the sender and receiver have some information about a social category. In (1),
the sender would feel no need for intersubjective verification, and therefore it falls
outside the scope of shared reality theory. In (2), the grounding of impressions is
unlikely to be sufficient because the receiver is more likely to question the sender’s
impression or to express a disagreement, thus failing to establish a shared reality.
In what follows, we elaborate on the present hypothesis by considering the measurement of essentialism and reviewing the existing literature on communication
and group perception.
Measuring Essentialism
We use the following two aspects as indices of essentialization of a social category:
(1) attribution of a trait disposition to the social category, and (2) belief that this
disposition is unalterable or immutable. Theoretical justification for this decision
is presented below.
Dispositional Attribution. When people apply the essence-appearance schema to
a social category, they may attribute a disposition to the social group. Indeed, as
Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske (1998) showed, when a collection of individuals is seen
to belong to a real social category (a university), people attributed dispositions
more strongly to the target group than when they were seen to be a mere aggregate
of individuals. Note that a stronger dispositional attribution can be measured as
an extreme rating of a social category on a trait dimension, an oft-used measure
of social stereotypes. Park and Judd (1990) showed that those who attribute a trait
disposition strongly to a group tend to see the disposition to be widely shared
within the group, and this perceived prevalence of the disposition is highly related
to perceived consistency of group behavior (Kashima et al., 2005). If a member of
a group is observed to have behaved in a certain way, another member is likely to
behave in a similar manner. Essentialism in this sense may be understood as an
aspect of perceived entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the perceived “degree of having
the nature of an entity or having real existence” (p. 17), as some have argued (e.g.,
Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006; Kashima et al., 2005; see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004,
for a variety of views). One strand of research has used this concept to measure
(e.g., Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995) and to manipulate (e.g., Dasgupta, Banaji, &
Abelson, 1999) perceived entitativity. Perceived consistency also mediates group
impression formation (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).
Immutability Belief. The second aspect of essentialism--belief that the underlying
essence of a social category is believed to be immutable--is particularly important.
We believe that one psychological symptom of some socially constructed object
to be treated as an aspect of social reality is that the object is believed to be un-
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alterable by human intervention; that is, people believe that the object cannot be
changed. Dweck’s (1999) notion of entity theory aptly captures this aspect of essentialism. According to Dweck and her colleagues (1999; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995), there are two general implicit theories about human nature. Entity theory
holds that various attributes of a person are fixed and cannot be changed by effort,
whereas incremental theory holds that attributes are malleable and can be altered
by self-development and cultivation. Bastian and Haslam (2006) showed that entity theory was one of the central aspects of the broader syndrome of essentialism.
Linking the immutability aspect of essentialism to its dispositionism aspect, Chiu,
Hong, and Dweck (1999) showed that, from an observation of an individual target’s behavior, entity theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to infer
the target’s underlying disposition, to generalize the observation to another context, and to make an extreme evaluation of the target. Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck
(1998) extended this work to social categories, showing that those who believe that
a social category has an unchangeable essence tend to hold stronger stereotypes.
It is often said that an essentialized social category is not only immutable, but
should also be biologically based. However, we contend that not all essences of essentialized social categories may be biological. Take a social category of Muslims
for example. This category may be essentialized if people regard its essence--belief
in Allah and way of living according to the Koran--to be an unchangeable essence
of their being, and it gives rise to its observable behavioral characteristics. Belief in
Allah does not have to be biologically based; all that is required in our definition of
essentialism is that people believe it is unchangeable. In this sense, our definition
entails the biologically based essentialism as its subset, but is broader than the
latter because it can be used to characterize social categories that are thought to
possess a nongenetic essence.
Communicating About a Social Category
We hypothesized that when a social category is well grounded and a shared reality is established, the sender’s perceptions of the social category are essentialized,
understood in terms of both (1) stronger dispositional attribution, and (2) greater
perceived immutability of the disposition. Whereas no evidence exists for (2), the
existing literature is consistent with (1). In Zajonc’s (1960) cognitive tuning work,
those who anticipated to communicate about a target person were shown to construct a more coherent impression about the target than those who expected to
receive a communication. Subsequent research showed that senders were more
likely than receivers to make trait inferences spontaneously (e.g., Hoffmann, Mischel, & Baer, 1984) and make stronger dispositional attributions to the target person (e.g., Harvey, Harkins, & Kagehiro, 1976; for a review, see Guerin & Innes,
1989). In this article, we will call polarization the tendency to make more extreme
dispositional judgments about a target when strong dispositional attributions are
made on a bipolar dimension anchored by two contrasted traits (e.g., kind vs. unkind). In a related vein, Higgins and Rholes (1978) gave their participants ambivalent information about a target individual, and told them to communicate about
the target to an audience whose attitude toward the target was either positive or
negative, so that the audience can identify the target. The message showed an
audience tuning: the participants described the target positively (negatively) for
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the audience who liked (disliked) the target, evaluated the target accordingly on
personality trait terms (i.e., stronger dispositional attribution), and recalled the
information congruent with the evaluation. Moreover, impressions became even
stronger after a delay. This has been called a “saying is believing (SIB)” effect. In
contrast, when participants did not communicate about the target, they did not
show any SIB effect. Thus, communications polarized impression judgments relative to the no communication condition.
Echterhoff et al.’s (2005, 2008) findings suggest that the SIB effect is largely due
to the communicators’ expectation and belief that they successfully grounded
their shared reality of the target with the audience. Using recall, the SIB effect was
obtained when the communicator was led to believe that the audience was able to
understand who the target was or that the audience was an ingroup member, who
he or she thought can be trusted as a source of valid information. Thus, beliefs or
expectations of successful grounding played an important role in the emergence
of a SIB. Zajonc’s (1960) Experiment 2 corroborates this point: he found a stronger
cognitive tuning effect when the message senders believed that their audience was
likely to agree with them than when they thought the audience would disagree
with their message. Taken together, the literature suggests that when the message
senders expected their audience would corroborate their impression of a target
individual, the senders’ impressions were more coherent and polarized.
Extending the communication effects on person perceptions to group perceptions, Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000) reported that when two people with firsthand information about a group (senders) and two others who had no information
(receivers) discussed about the target group that was described by a mixture of
stereotypical and counter-stereotypical information, both the senders’ and receivers’ impressions about the group were more polarized than when they had no
discussion. Within the “saying is believing” experimental paradigm, Haussmann,
Levine, and Higgins (2008) also showed that the SIB effect was obtained for a
group target as well. Brauer, Judd, and Jacquelin’s (2001) findings suggest that
this polarization effect is likely due to the grounding of the stereotypical information, and its intersubjective validation. When everyone in a three-person discussion group had more stereotypical than counter-stereotypical information, their
impressions after the discussion were more polarized than when one of the three
members had more counter-stereotypical than stereotypical information (the other
two had more stereotypical than counter-stereotypical information). Apparently,
the dissenting voice of the person who had more counter-stereotypical information disrupted the grounding of the stereotypical information, thus preventing the
impressions from polarizing.
Present Research
We tested the hypotheses that communication about a group strengthens the sender’s attribution of trait-like dispositions to the group, and immutability perceptions of the group. In Study 1, we examined the effect of written communication to
ingroup members about impressions about a new outgroup. Participants received
behavioral information about members of a social category (i.e., an unnamed residential college at the university), and asked to communicate or to memorize them.
In the communication condition, they wrote letters describing the group. Group
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impressions in the communication and memory conditions were compared. Using similar stimuli, Study 2 examined the effect of grounding activities generated
by the receiver on the sender’s group impressions by manipulating the receiver’s
responses. In Study 3, we allowed a sender and a receiver to interact freely face-toface, and examined the effects of naturally occurring grounding activities on the
sender’s and receiver’s group impressions.

Study 1
This study examined the effect of senders’ communication on their tendency to essentialize. Participants were given mildly positive or negative information about
the target group, and told to communicate about it to their friends and relatives,
arguably the people with whom they would expect to be able to ground their
shared reality. The memory condition served as a control condition. Participants
were then asked to make attributions of trait dispositions and judgments of immutability of the dispositions. It was hypothesized that the expectation of successfully
grounding information about a novel group would be sufficient to essentialize the
communicator’s group impression. Attributions of dispositions that correspond
to the stimulus information would be stronger (and therefore trait attributions be
more polarized) and the dispositions would be more strongly believed to be immutable in the communication condition than in the memory condition.

Method
Participants and Design
Ninety-two undergraduate students (30 men, 62 women) at a university in Melbourne, Australia, were recruited for participation in this experiment. They were
paid AUD5 for one hour. The experiment was two-way factorial. One factor was
the instructions, communication versus memory. The other factor was the stimulus condition. Friendly behaviors were more prevalent in one condition, and hostile behaviors were more prevalent in the other condition (friendly vs hostile).
Stimuli
The stimuli were 20 behavioral episodes purportedly performed by individual
members of a group on campus. The behaviors were selected from a pool of items
pretested on 100 participants to determine the extent to which they are hostile
or friendly on a 9-point scale (1 = hostile, 9 = friendly). The mean ratings were
used as estimates of the scale values of those items. The number of episodes for
the friendly condition were 2 (3-4, namely, scale values between 3 and 4), 4 (4-5),
8 (5-6), 4 (6-7), and 2 (7-8). The behaviors for the hostile condition were 2 (2-3), 4
(3-4), 8 (4-5), 4 (5-6), and 2 (6-7). Therefore these items roughly formed a symmetric
distribution on the bipolar dimension with the mean slightly on the friendly side
in the friendly condition, and vice versa.
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Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to
examine the process by which people deal with information about other people’s
behaviors. Half of the participants were told that their task is to memorize the
information presented about a group of people (memory condition), and the other
half was told to read the information so that they can communicate what they
have learned about the group (communication condition). The stimuli were then
presented in a booklet with one behavioral episode printed on each page. The participants were given 8 seconds to read each page.
In the communication condition, the participants were asked to write three short
notes about the group to three different people: an older relative, a high school
friend, and a university friend. They were given 2 minutes to write each note. In
the meantime in the memory condition, the participants were given a distracter
task of drawing the floor plan of their house. Immediately afterwards, the participants were then given a questionnaire containing dependent variables.
The participants were first asked to report their impressions of the group on six
trait dimensions (5-point scale: 5 = extremely descriptive, 1 = not at all descriptive). Three traits were consistent with friendliness (friendly, warm, outgoing) and
the other three were consistent with hostility (hostile, cold, aggressive). The traits
were presented in a random order.
Next, two other tasks were presented in random orders. One was a consistency
judgment in which the participants judged the likelihood that another member of
the group would have each of the personality traits as in the impression judgment
task. The other was a percentage estimation task in which the participants estimated the percentage of the members of the group who would have each personality
trait. The same traits were used and the response scale varied from 0 to 100.
Finally, the participants responded to three items to measure people’s implicit
theory of personality (Chiu et al., 1997). Although the original items asked about
the immutability of people’s disposition in general, the present version was reworded to tap the respondent’s perceived immutability of the particular group.
The items were: “It is unlikely that the core disposition of this group can be altered
though some things may be modified,” “This group has its basic and ingrained
dispositions, and you really can’t do much to change them,” and “Some events
may change superficial things about the group, but the fundamental nature of this
group is something that cannot be changed much.” The participants used a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).

Results
Because factor analyses of the friendly and hostile trait attributions formed two
independent factors the judgments on friendly traits and the judgments on hostile traits were averaged separately. Cronbach’s αs were .78 and .88, for friendliness and hostility attributions. Similarly, percentage estimates and generalizability
judgments were aggregated to compute perceived consistency measures: friendliness and hostility judgments were averaged separately. Cronbach’s αs were .88
and .95 for friendly and hostile consistency judgments. The items for immutability
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TABLE 1. Effects of Instructions on Trait Dispositional Attribution and Perceived Consistency on
Stimulus Consistent and Non-Consistent Traits, and Immutability Belief, and Their Relevant Means in
the Memory and Communication Conditions in Study 1
Memory

Comm.

F(1,88)

ηp2

Consistent Traits

3.3

3.8

8.14**

.09

Other Traits

2.2

2.3

0.34

.00

Consistent Traits

49.5

61.1

6.74*

.07

Other Traits

28.0

29.8

0.30

.00

3.0

3.4

5.28*

.06

Measurement
Trait Dispositional Attribution

Perceived Consistency

Immutability Belief
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05

belief items were averaged to form an immutability belief index (Cronbach’s α =
.67).
To examine the effect of communication, a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on dispositional attributions of the consistent traits (i.e., friendliness attributions in the friendly stimulus condition, and vice versa). One factor
was prevalent behavior (friendly vs. hostile) and the other factor was instruction
(communication vs. memory). Only the main effect of instruction was significant,
suggesting that the effect of communication did not depend on the valence of the
stimuli. The results are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with expectation, communicating about the target group polarized the judgments on traits that are consistent with the overall impression of the group.
Interestingly, a comparable analysis on trait judgments about the nonconsistent
traits (i.e., friendly traits in the hostile behavior condition, and vice versa) showed
that the communication did not polarize the attribution of dispositions that are
not closely related to the stimulus information. There was no significant effect of
instruction (see Table 1). However, trait attributions were slightly higher in the
hostile (M = 2.5) than in the friendly condition (M = 2.1), F(1, 88) = 5.38, p < .05, ηp2
= .06. Presumably, people were more willing to attribute friendly than hostile traits
even when the overall impression was negative.
Likewise, comparable ANOVAs were conducted for the perceived consistency
on the consistent and nonconsistent traits. Again, the instruction main effect was
significant for the consistent traits (Table 1): participants perceived a higher degree
of consistency among the group members’ behaviors after they had communicated
about the group than when they had simply recalled their observations. With regard to the nonconsistent traits, only a prevalent behavior main effect was significant. Mirroring the trait judgments, perceived consistency among group members
was greater in the hostile condition (M = 38.7) than in the friendly condition (M =
19.0), F(1,88) = 35.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .29.
Finally, immutability belief was subjected to an ANOVA. The instruction main
effect was the only significant effect (Table 1): communicating about the target
group strengthened the belief that the group disposition is unalterable.
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Discussion
As expected, communicating about a target group, relative to memorizing about
it, essentialized the sender’s group impressions by polarizing the attribution of
trait dispositions that are consistent with the overall impression of the group, and
strengthening the immutability belief about the group. Overall, communication
may help essentialize a social category. This is analogous to, but also extends, Echterhoff et al.’s (2005) finding that a message production for an ingroup member
was sufficient to generate a SIB effect. Echterhoff et al.’s finding was concerned
about an effect of message production on recall; in this study, we showed that
message productions for ingroup members were sufficient not only to polarize the
group impression, but also to strengthen the immutability belief about the group’s
essence.
It is interesting to note that perceived consistency also showed a pattern comparable to dispositional attribution. The attribution of trait dispositions to a group
and consistency judgments were so highly correlated (between .64 and .80) that
they are likely to be measuring the same underlying construct. Indeed, our perceived consistency measure is very similar to one type of perceived homogeneity
measure used by Park and Judd (1990; percentage estimation task), in which these
measures and trait attribution measures loaded on the same underlying latent
variable. We will drop the perceived consistency measure from the next studies.
Interestingly, the communication did not affect the attribution of trait dispositions that are not consistent with the overall impression of the group. The perceived consistency again showed a comparable pattern. Thus, it is not that communication strengthens any beliefs, but its effects are selective and localized to the
judgments relevant to the stimulus information. Presumably, when people communicate about a target group, they attempt to present a coherent picture about
it; in so doing, the information that is consistent with the overall impression may
be emphasized more, but the other information may not be affected. It is noteworthy that, although the original stimuli were pilot tested in terms of the bipolar
dimension of friendliness versus hostility, this bipolar dimension may be better
understood as two related unipolar dimensions. A group that is not friendly is not
necessarily hostile, but may be simply neutral; a group that is not hostile is not
always friendly. In order to avoid this complication, different stimuli were used to
extend the generality of the findings.

Study 2
Study 1 showed that a sender’s message production may be sufficient to essentialize the sender’s views about the social category even in the absence of the receiver’s response. In this second study, we examined the potential effect of the
receiver’s grounding by systematically manipulating the receiver’s grounding behavior. In particular, we trained confederates to interact with senders differently:
in one condition, the receivers were trained to accept the sender’s message only
minimally by nodding or uttering a brief sentence (minimal grounding) or more
extensively by paraphrasing or asking relevant questions (elaborate grounding).
We also measured grounding activities in this study. Although duration of time
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that people spent talking about relevant information has been measured in previous studies on group discussion and stereotype formation, grounding activities
have not been directly measured.

Method
Participants and Design
Forty undergraduate students at a university in Melbourne, Australia participated
in the experiment (17 men, 23 women). They were all native speakers of English or
had lived in Australia more than 15 years. Each participant was paired with one of
two female confederates.
There were two experimental conditions (minimal vs. elaborate grounding) in
which a female confederate posed as a participant. In both conditions, the confederate started the conversation by asking the participant for information about
the club members. However, in the minimal grounding condition, the confederate
gave only brief responses (e.g., “OK,” “um-hum,” “right”), nonverbal behaviors
(e.g., nods and gestures), and asked brief, nonspecific questions to maintain the
conversational flow where required (e.g., “So can you remember anything else?”).
In the elaborate grounding condition, the confederate responded with more elaborate responses by paraphrasing the sender’s impressions (e.g., “OK, so the club
members sound really organized then”), and asked more specific questions (e.g.,
“So do you think they were nice people, or nasty?), in addition to nonverbal behaviors.
Within each grounding condition, either positive or negative behaviors of members of an unidentified university club were presented. Thirty-six behaviors were
selected from a pool of behaviors that had been rated by separate 46 participants
on kindness and organization (1 = unkind to 9 = kind; 1 = disorganized to 9 =
organized). The means were used to estimate their scale values. For the positive
stimulus set, 8 behaviors were selected whose scale values were between 5 and
6 on both kindness and organization. Then, for each dimension (e.g., kindness),
we selected 3 (8-7), 5 (7-6), 4 (5-4), and 2 (4-3) behaviors. These latter behaviors’
scale values were in the neutral range (i.e., between 4 and 6) on the other dimension (e.g., organization). Likewise, for the negative stimulus set, 8 behaviors were
selected whose scale values were between 4 and 5 on both dimensions. Again, for
each dimension, we selected 3 (2-3), 5 (3-4), 4 (5-6), and 2 (6-7) behaviors. These
latter behaviors were neutral on the other dimension (between 4 and 6).
The design was a grounding condition (minimal vs. elaborate) x prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) factorial.
Procedure
Sessions took place in a small interview room equipped with a video camera. Each
participant was introduced to a confederate as another naive participant, who was
said to be the participant’s conversation partner. The experimenter then asked the
confederate to wait outside while the participant completed a task. The participant
read an instruction sheet informing them that they would be reading some information about members of a university club, so that he or she can “communicate
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what you have learned about the group to your communication partner.” One half
of the participants read the positive set, whereas the other half read the negative
set. Each behavior was printed on one card, and they were given 8 seconds to read
each card. The order of the cards was randomized for each session by shuffling
them. Once the participant had finished reading the stimuli, the confederate was
returned to the room. Both the participant and confederate were given a second
instruction sheet explaining the conversation task. They were told that a conversation would continue for 3 minutes, and that the receiver was to start the conversation by asking questions about the target group. The experimenter left the room,
and returned after 3 minutes. Even if the conversation was continuing, it was terminated at that point. At the conclusion of the conversation, both participant and
confederate completed the questionnaire rating the target group on four trait dimensions (kind, unkind, organized, and disorganized) on a 5-point scale (1 = not
at all, 5 = very) and in terms of the three immutability belief items (1 = disagree, 5
= agree). The participant was fully debriefed as to the confederate’s identity at the
conclusion of the session.

Results and Discussion
Conversational Data
The videotaped conversations were transcribed. Each conversation was first broken into conversational units based on grounding activities. In its simplest form, a
conversational unit consisted of the presentation of some information by one participant, and the acceptance by the confederate. In more complex examples, a conversational unit might contain two or three presentations and acceptances by the
participant and confederate to establish mutual understanding of the topic. Nonetheless, to the extent that one segment of a conversation was concerned about one
topic, it was coded as a conversational unit. Two coders undertook this analysis
independently first, and then they discussed to resolve their disagreements, so
that the subsequent coding could be conducted further.
Each conversational unit was coded as a whole at three levels of grounding: assumed, minimal, or extended. A conversational unit in which the presentation of
relevant information was met by neither verbal nor nonverbal responses that indicated acceptance of the information was coded as assumed grounding. The past
research in group discussions would have coded such instances as the presence of
relevant information in discussion; following this convention, we regarded this as
the transmission of some information in the conversation. Minimal grounding was
indicated by a nonverbal response by a conversant or by a brief verbal response
that indicated the conversant’s understanding (e.g., “OK,” “Right,” “Uh-hm”). Extended grounding was indicated by more elaborate and detailed responses (e.g.,
“OK, so they had pretty busy lifestyles then”) or by more specific questions (e.g.,
“Did you get the impression they were nice people?”). Each conversational unit
contained one or more presentations about relevant information: each presentation
was coded in terms of whether it implied kind, unkind, organized or disorganized
impressions. The inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ) between two independent coders was satisfactory for grounding (κ = .74) and for the classification of presentations (κ = .76). Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
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Based on the agreed coding, grounding score was computed for each conversational unit using the following formula: GL*Abs[N(k)-N(u)+N(o)-N(d)]/
[N(k)+N(u)+N(o)+N(d)], where GL indicates the level of grounding achieved for
the conversational unit (Assumed Grounding = 1; Minimal Grounding = 2; Elaborate Grounding = 3), N() represents the number of pieces of information, kind = k,
unkind = u, organized = o, or disorganized = d, and Abs[] indicates the absolute
value of the number within the square brackets. When there was no relevant information in a given conversational unit (i.e., N(k)+N(u)+N(o)+N(d) = 0), this score
was set at 0. The score was then summed across all conversational units.
This index is based on the assumption that people would aggregate information for each conversational unit, and the manner of aggregation followed the
weighted averaging model (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima,
2000) where a positive piece of information was scaled as +1 and a negative piece
scaled as -1. Because the main dependent variable was extremity of the judgments
on kindness and organization, its absolute value was multiplied by the grounding level, so that the more elaborate is the type of grounding, the higher is the
grounding score. We then simply aggregated the scores of conversational units by
summing them.
Judgment Data
The absolute value of the difference between the rating of kindness and the rating
of unkindness was computed to index the dispositional attribution of kindness;
the absolute value of the difference between the rating of organization and that
of disorganization was used as a measure of dispositional attribution of organization. Immutability belief was computed by averaging the three items and the reliability was reasonable (α = .67).
Preliminary Analyses
The extremity, immutability belief, and grounding measures were compared between the two confederates. No differences were detected. Confederate was not
included in further analyses. Second, the effectiveness of the grounding manipulation was checked by subjecting the grounding measure to an ANOVA with prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) and condition (elaborate vs. minimal grounding) as between-subjects factors. As expected, condition had the only significant
effect, F(1, 36) = 22.88, ηp2 = .389, p < .001. Grounding activities were more elaborate
in the elaborate grounding condition (M = 4.92) than in the minimal grounding
condition (M = 2.03).
Dispositional Attribution and Immutability Belief
Dispositional attributions of kindness and organization were analyzed by a mixeddesign ANOVA with prevalent behavior and condition as between-subjects factors
and dimension (kindness vs. organization) as within-subjects factor. There was a
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TABLE 2. Correlations of Grounding with Extremity of Kindness and Organization Judgments
and Immutability Belief in Studies 2 and 3
Average Extremity

Kindness

Organization

Immutability Belief

Study 2
Sender

.44**

.25†

.43**

Sender

.63**

.25

.64**

Receiver

.53**

.45*

.38†

.21

Study 3
.54*
-.06

Note. **p < .01, *p < .05, †p = .06, one-tailed

marginally significant condition effect, F(1, 36) = 2.84, ηp2 = .073, p = .10, where the
mean extremity was somewhat greater in the elaborate grounding condition (M =
1.04) than in the minimal grounding condition (M = .80). However, this effect was
qualified by dimension, Wilks’s Λ = .88, F(1, 36) = 5.10, ηp2 = .12, p = .03. The attribution of organization was clearly greater in the elaborate grounding condition
than in the minimal grounding condition (Melaborate = 1.23, Mminimal = .75); however,
extremity on kindness did not differ between the conditions (Melaborate = .85, Mminimal
= .85).
To examine whether grounding mediates the condition x dimension interaction
effect, an ANCOVA was conducted with the same three factors and grounding as
a covariate. First of all, as expected, grounding had a significant main effect, F(1,
35) = 5.25, ηp2 = .131, p = .028. This shows that the mediator has a direct relationship with the criterion. Second, the significant condition x dimension interaction
in the previous ANOVA became nonsignificant, Wilks’s Λ = .918, F(1, 35) = 3.14, ηp2
= .082, p = .085, providing some evidence for mediation by measured grounding
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). The main effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 35) =
.001, ηp2 = .00, p = .971.
To further examine the relationship between grounding and dispositional attribution, we computed the correlations of grounding with average attribution (averaged across kindness and organization), as well as attributions of kindness and
of organization separately (Table 2). The correlations were generally significant
except that the correlation involving attribution of kindness was only marginal (p
= .057).
Immutability belief was analyzed by an ANOVA with stimulus and condition as
between-subjects factors. The predicted condition effect was not significant, F(1,
36) = .79, ηp2 = .021, p = .38. The correlation between grounding and immutability
belief was not significant though in the expected direction (Table 2).
The manipulated grounding had an expected effect on dispositional attribution
of organization; however, its effect was only marginal for kindness. Furthermore,
the nature of the elaborate grounding condition was such that it basically invited
the sender to make trait dispositional inferences. It is not too surprising that elaborate grounding resulted in a greater polarization. In addition, the manipulated
grounding failed to produce a statistically significant effect on immutability belief. Although the results were generally encouraging, the contrived nature of the
staged conversation may have produced weak effects. We examined the grounding in conversations between naive participants in Study 3.
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Study 3
In Study 3, we examined the effects of grounding on essentialism in free face-toface conversations involving naive participants. We expected that the more elaborate their grounding activities, the more essentialized their impressions would be.
However, senders and receivers may respond differently to grounding activities.
Note that our reasoning that senders would regard receivers’ comprehension (i.e.,
grounding) as indicative of the latter’s tacit agreement does not have to extend
to receivers. When the sender’s impression is grounded, he or she may feel that
a shared reality is established, but the receiver may not. In line with this, Brauer,
Judd, and Gliner’s (1995) findings suggest that grounding may affect the senders
more than the receivers. In their study, participants had a group discussion about
attitudinal issues, and the effects of their expressing their own attitudes and hearing others’ opinions were examined on their resultant attitudes. In two studies,
expression of one’s attitudes had a consistently positive effect on one’s final attitudes; however, hearing others’ opinions had little effect. Although this research is
concerned with attitudes, and not about dispositional attributions, it suggests that
senders’ own expressions affected their own attitudes, but not receivers’.
Nevertheless, Thompson et al.’s (2000) Experiment 1 suggests that communication may affect receivers more than senders. They formed three generations
of three communicators. In the first generation, three people received firsthand
behavioral information about a target group (more stereotypical than counterstereotypical information) and each wrote three notes to the second generation
participants, who received all three notes from the first generation and wrote three
notes to the third generation participants. Written communications were sent from
one generation to the next, but there was no interaction. They found that the attribution of stereotypical traits became more extreme from the first to the second
generation though it did not change from the second to the third generation. It is
unknown whether the first generation senders’ impressions were more polarized
due to communication because there was no control; however, communication
seems to have affected the receivers’ impressions more than the senders’ in this
study.
Nonetheless, neither Brauer et al.’s (1995) nor Thompson et al.’s (2000) study
examined communication processes as joint activities between a sender and a
receiver. Brauer et al. did not examine explicitly how people’s expressions were
grounded by their audiences; Thompson et al.’s Experiment 1 was a one-way communication from one generation to the next without feedback from the latter to
the former. Thus, the present study examined how grounding as joint activities
promotes essentialism in senders and receivers.

Method
Participants and Design
Thirty-six undergraduate students (3 men, 33 women) at a university in Melbourne took part in the study. They were either native speakers of English or had
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lived in Australia more than 15 years. Two participants were recruited at a time to
form a pair. It was ensured that they had no contact prior to the experiment. One
in each pair was randomly assigned the role of a sender, who read the information
about a group of people; the other took the role of a receiver, who was to form an
impression of the group on the basis of the information communicated to him or
her through conversation with the sender. Participants were given either positive
or negative behaviors as in Study 2.
The design was a role (sender vs. receiver) x prevalent behavior (positive vs.
negative) factorial with the former as a repeated measures factor.
Procedure
A male experimenter greeted two unacquainted participants when they arrived.
He described the experiment as examining how people communicate about a
group to another person who has no knowledge about the group. Participants
were randomly assigned to the roles of sender and receiver. The receiver was then
instructed to start and lead the conversation by asking questions about the group
and generally to keep the conversation active. The sender and the receiver were
then taken to separate rooms adjacent to the original room. The experimenter gave
the sender a list of behaviors purportedly performed by the members of the target
group. The list contained the 36 behaviors used in Study 2 in a random order, and
the sender was given 5 minutes to read through it and to form impressions about
the group, so that he or she could “communicate what you have learned about
the group to your communication partner.” While the sender read the stimuli,
the receiver performed an unrelated task. When the time was up, the sender and
receiver were then ushered back to the original room, where they were told to
start their conversation. A video camera was visible from the participants, they
were told that a conversation would continue for 5 minutes, the instructions were
repeated for the receiver to start the conversation by asking questions about the
target group, and the experimenter left the room.
After 5 minutes, the experimenter returned to the room, stopped the camera,
and handed out a questionnaire in which participants rated the target group on
four trait dimensions (kind, unkind, organized, and disorganized) on a 5-point
scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very). Participants also responded to the three immutability
belief items (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).

Results
Conversational Data
The videotaped conversations were transcribed. The same coding procedure was
followed as in Study 2. The inter-rater reliability was acceptable for grounding (κ =
.75) as well as for the classification of the statements (κ = .78). Disagreements were resolved by discussion. Although we coded for the extent to which receivers expressed
agreement or disagreement with the senders’ presentations, there was no instance
of disagreement; therefore, this was not included in the further analysis. Given the
nature of the task--senders had all the information and receivers had none--this is
expected. Based on the coding, grounding index was computed as in Study 2.
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Judgment Data
Again, the absolute value of the difference between the rating of kindness and
the rating of unkindness was computed to index the judgment extremity on the
kindness dimension; the absolute value of the difference between the rating of
organization and that of disorganization was used as the judgment extremity on
organization. The extremity score served as the measure of the strength of dispositional attribution. Immutability belief was computed by averaging the three items.
Nonetheless, the reliability was relatively low (α = .57), thus requiring a cautious
interpretation. There was no significant difference between the senders and receivers on any of the scores, t < .60, ns. Their group impressions were analyzed
separately.
Sender. An analysis of covariance was conducted on the extremity score with
prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) as a between-subjects factor and dimension (kindness vs. organization) as repeated measures, and grounding as a covariate. As expected, the main effect of grounding was significant, F(1, 15) = 9.58, ηp2
= .39, p = .007. There was also a significant interaction of stimulus and dimension,
Wilks’s Λ = .73, F(1, 15) = 5.68, ηp2 = .28, p = .031. The estimated means showed
that judgment extremity was greater on organization than on kindness when the
overall stimulus was negative (Means: Kind = .54; Organized = 1.18); however,
there was no difference between the two for the positive set (Means: Kind = .87;
Organized = .86).
Because there was no dimension x grounding interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .73, F(1,
15) = 2.28, ηp2 = .13, p = .15, we computed the average of the extremity scores and
correlated it with grounding. We computed the correlations of grounding with
extremity scores on kindness and organization separately as well because we only
found a marginal effect on kindness in Study 2. The results are reported in Table
2. All correlations were in the expected direction and mostly significant; however,
the correlation between grounding and kindness was not significant.
An ANCOVA was also conducted on sender’s immutability belief with stimulus
type as a between-subjects factor and grounding as a covariate. Only the main effect of grounding was significant, F(1, 14) = 5.33, ηp2 = .28, p = .037.
Receiver. Extremity scores on kindness and organization were subjected to an
analysis of covariance with prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) as a betweensubjects factor, dimension as within-subjects factor, and grounding as a covariate.
Only the main effect of grounding was significant, F(1, 15) = 5.14, p = .039, ηp2 = .26.
Immutability belief was analyzed with an ANCOVA with prevalent behavior as a
between-subjects factor and grounding as a covariate. However, none of the effects
was significant. Again, comparable correlations were computed (Table 2). All correlations were statistically significant except that receiver immutability belief did
not correlate with grounding.

Discussion
Study 3 showed the relationship between grounding activities and essentialism.
The receivers’ more elaborate acceptance of the senders’ communication encouraged the senders to essentialize the target group, namely, to make stronger disposi-

COMMUNICATION AND ESSENTIALISM

323

tional attributions and to hold stronger beliefs that the dispositions are immutable.
Therefore, the senders whose communication was elaborately grounded have felt
that the target group possessed an immutable essence. It is interesting to note that
for senders, the relationship between grounding and extremity was significant for
organization, but not for kindness. This parallels the results in Study 2, where the
effect of grounding was clearly significant for organization, but only marginal for
kindness. It is difficult to interpret this difference, but may require further research
into the difference between the moral dimension related to warmth and coldness
(such as kindness) and the ability dimension related to competence and incompetence (such as organization) in future research. By contrast, for receivers, although
the more elaborate grounding appears to polarize the receivers’ group impressions
on both kindness and organization, this did not translate to a stronger belief in the
immutability of the group disposition. This suggests that grounding activities do
not necessarily result in the receivers’ shared reality. It is understandable that the
receivers did not feel that their comprehension of the senders’ impressions meant
their tacit agreement.
The results were generally in line with Brauer et al.’s (1995) findings about
group discussion and attitudes. Given the nature of the current task, all grounding activities were based on the senders’ expressed opinions about the target: the
more the senders expressed their views about the target group, the more grounding activities have occurred, and the greater was the polarization. However, our
results went beyond their findings in that not only were group dispositions attributed more strongly, but the attributed dispositions were more strongly believed
to be immutable. Nonetheless, the effects of grounding on the receivers’ group
dispositional attributions somewhat diverged from Brauer et al.’s results; in their
study, hearing others’ opinions did not affect receivers’ attitudes. Still, our results
are understandable given the nature of the task. Receivers had only the senders’
communications in making judgments about the target group: the more information was grounded about the target group, the stronger were the receivers’ dispositional attributions. This may have simply reflected the effect of the amount of
information available to the receivers.
This study yielded results somewhat different from Thompson et al.’s Experiment 1, where they found that receivers’ impressions were more polarized than
senders’. However, this may be because of the difference in the communication
task. Thompson et al.’s receivers received three independent communications from
three senders. The fact that multiple senders independently gave similar communications about the target group would surely increase the intersubjective validity
of the target impression, just as in Asch’s (1956) classical research where the level
of conformity increased when the pressure came from three people rather than
only two. In the present study, there was only one information source.

General Discussion
The results generally supported the hypothesis that communication promotes essentialism through grounding. We argued that two measures would reflect essentialism as a psychological symptom of the feeling that a social category is socially
real, namely, attributions of dispositions to a social category and beliefs in their
immutability. In Study 1, communicators essentialized more than those who sim-
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TABLE 3. Meta-Analysis of the Effect Sizes (z) in Studies 1 Through 3
Study

N

Study 1

92

2.78

Study 2

40

1.64

Study 3

18

Extremity

Immutability Belief
2.26
(2.20)

0.88

3.63**

(3.85***)

2.75*

(3.09*)

χ

2.81

(2.55)

1.63

(1.08)

p for χ2

.25

(.28)

.44

(.58)

8

(9)

3

(5)

Overall z
2

Fail-safe N

2.68

(1.75)

2.06

Note. Within parentheses are the relevant numerical values based on measured (rather than manipulated) grounding in
study 2; ***p < .0001; **p < .001; *p < .01.

ply memorized information. In Study 2, we manipulated the grounding activities.
Extensive grounding strengthened the senders’ attribution of one of the dispositions (i.e., organization), but not the other. When measured grounding was used
as a predictor, it was shown to correlate with the senders’ overall dispositional
attribution, but it did not significantly correlate with immutability belief. Instead
of the contrived conversations, in Study 3, naive participants acted as senders and
receivers. They showed stronger attributions of dispositions to the social category
when they engaged in more extensive grounding; however, grounding was associated with the senders’ immutability beliefs only, and not with the receivers’.
The overall weight of evidence appears to support the hypothesis; however, we
decided to conduct a simple meta-analysis to estimate the effect sizes of the relationships of grounding with dispositional attribution and immutability belief.
The F-statistic (and the relevant degree of freedom) computed within the ANOVA
or ANCOVA was used to estimate a z-valued effect size for each study, and the
overall effect size was then estimated by weighting each effect size by the sample
size (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991). We used META (Kenny, 2003) to compute the
relevant statistics (Table 3). The effect sizes were reasonably homogeneous (χ2 statistics were not significant). The overall effect size was highly significant for both
dispositional attribution and immutability belief. When converted to correlations,
the relation between grounding and dispositional attribution was approximately
.31, and the relation between grounding and immutability belief was .21. We also
computed the effect sizes based on the measured grounding, rather than manipulated grounding; the overall effect sizes were again significant for dispositional
attribution and immutability belief. The fail-safe N, which indicates the number
of nil results required to make the overall effect nonsignificant, suggests that the
results were reasonably robust.
It is perhaps not too surprising that elaborate grounding strengthens the attribution of underlying dispositions to a social category. Provided that there is already a spontaneous cognitive tendency to make dispositional inferences while
just planning to communicate (Hoffmann et al., 1984), elaborate grounding could
facilitate their cognitive rehearsal, elaboration, and bolstering along the relevant
trait dimension, and this can produce a moderate level of relationship between
grounding and dispositional attribution. However, it is intriguing to consider the
following possibility. It may be because communicators are usually asked to elaborate along dispositional trait dimensions in typical conversations about individu-
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als and groups that they tend to make spontaneous trait inferences when they are
preparing to communicate about them. In other words, it may be the linguistic
practice of talking about dispositional trait implications that is responsible for the
grounding-polarization relationship.
Nonetheless, it is less obvious how cognitively elaborating on an inferred disposition alone can turn it into an immutable essence. Elaboration would make
the inferred disposition more extreme, but why should elaboration make it immutable? We contend that it is the activation of the essence-appearance schema
due to its intersubjective verification that turns the inferred disposition into an
immutable essence. Thus, our findings add to the growing literature on shared reality by showing that elaborate grounding strengthens immutability beliefs about
the attributed dispositions. This aspect of the findings suggests that interpersonal
communication, particularly, grounding processes, plays a significant role in the
construction of a shared social reality. As we noted earlier, the immutability aspect
of essentialism implies that the immutable essence is beyond human intervention
and manipulation; it may be believed to be something entrenched in one’s shared
reality that it cannot be altered. Although this latter effect is only weak, if recurrent
and cumulated over time, it may play an important role.
Our theoretical reasoning and empirical data suggest that some conditions need
to be met for grounding to result in essentializing. First, senders have ambiguous
information, but receivers have no information, about a social category. Second,
the receivers should have sufficient epistemic credibility for the senders to be able
to act as a partner for social verification. Echterhoff et al.’s (2005) work suggests
that the sender and receiver’s shared group membership satisfies this condition.
It is the ambiguity of the information that motivates the senders to seek intersubjective verification about the social category, and it is the epistemic authority of
the senders that prevent receivers from voicing disagreement. The senders take
the absence of an explicit dissent as a tacit agreement, and this result in their assumption that there is a shared reality because the receiver is seen by the sender to
have sufficient epistemic credibility. However, the grounding-essentializing process does not apply to receivers; the fact that they do not express disagreements
does not mean that they agree, and they presumably do not activate the essenceappearance schema.
This implies that when both communicators already have some information by
observing members of a social category, mere grounding is unlikely to be sufficient
for the essentialization of the social category. In this instance, the sender and the
receiver are equal in their epistemic authority--unless one has a special expertise
or other status characteristic--and neither may be willing to take the absence of an
explicit disagreement as sufficient evidence for intersubjective verification. Here,
an explicit agreement about each other’s perceptions, beliefs, and feelings may be
required to establish the shared reality of a social category, and to essentialize it.
Second, the grounding-essentializing process applies only to social categories
because the essence-appearance schema is less likely to be applied to other types
of social groups based on shared goals and tasks (e.g., juries, committees, boards
of directors). When group members’ behaviors are used as a basis for inferring
their shared goals (Ip et al., 2006), these goals are less likely to be seen as immutable because goals are humanly constructed psychological entities. This is not to
say that goal-based groups can never be essentialized--witness essentialization of
terrorist groups for instance--but they are less likely to be.
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All in all, the present research showed that there exists a circumstance in which
interpersonal grounding processes, and resultant establishment of shared reality,
play a significant role for the communicative construction of the social reality of
a social category. It remains to be seen how far and how strong this phenomenon
may extend in our everyday life.
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